


# DApTter: Preventing User Data Abuse in Deep Learning Inference Services

Hao Wu<sup>1</sup>, Xuejin Tian<sup>1</sup>, Yuhang Gong<sup>1</sup>, Xing Su<sup>1</sup>, **Minghao Li<sup>1,2</sup>**, Fengyuan Xu<sup>1\*</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Nanjing University



<sup>2</sup>Cornell University





# Deep Learning Inference Service (*DLIS*) prospers.



*Cyber Defense*

*Self Driving*

*Medical Diagnosis*


*Marketing Automation*

*Virtual Agents*


*Processes Automation*

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
# DLIS Scenario




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

# Data abuse issue



**DLIS**




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


**Data abuse is about the rights of data owners in the context of DLIS.**



- 1. Infer private info.
- 2. Train new models.


# Problem Requirements



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## Honest Provider:

- Attract more customers
- Reduce potential risks of violating laws (GDPR, CCPA)




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
- S1.** Not visually recognizable
- S2.** Only retain necessary features
- S3.** Can't be reversed



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**DLIS** → **U2.** No Changes


**Results** → **U1.** Maintain Accuracy

**U3.** Efficient

# Problem Requirements

## Honest Provider:

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**Security**

**Balance**

**Usability**

Weak security solution


- DP, MP, PAN

Low usability solution


- TEE, FHE



# Our solution *DAPter*




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






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# DApTter Use Case




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
# Workflow

A user-side **entropy reduction** approach to **prune information** not relevant to the target DLIS in user data.




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
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
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


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
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


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
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
# Training Structure & Model Architecture




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

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# Training Structure & Model Architecture



1. A symmetrical U-Net like architecture.
2. Input and output are of the same size.
3. "Copy" connection captures the high-level semantic info and low-level spatial info.

# Data Abuse Prevention Loss

*Minimize the piece of pixel-wise entropy that contributes little to the high-level features.*

$$L_{dap} = \lambda * L_{\eta} + (1 - \lambda) * L_{acc}, \lambda \in (0, 1)$$



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
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
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$$L_{\eta} = \sum_I \eta(I, I_{ref})$$

$\eta$  is L1 norm;  $I$  is the converted image;  $I_{ref}$  is the reference image with each pixel equaling to (R128, G128, B128).

\*Proof can be found in our paper

# Hyperparameter $\lambda$ Exploration

$$L_{dap} = \lambda * L_{\eta} + (1 - \lambda) * L_{acc}, \lambda \in (0, 1)$$


*A larger  $\lambda$  lets DAPter remove more entropy but leads to a low DLIS accuracy.*

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
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□ cifar10\_lenet   
 — cifar10\_resnet18   
 ◇ cifar10\_vgg11   
 ▲ imagenet10\_resnet50   
 ▼ imagenet10\_vgg16   
 ○ imagenet32\_resnet18



(a) Relationship between  $\lambda$  and Accuracy




(b) Relationship between  $\lambda$  and Entropy

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
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(a) Relationship between  $\lambda$  and Accuracy



(b) Relationship between  $\lambda$  and Entropy

$\lambda = 0.9$  is a sweet point to balance security and usability.


# Conversion Quality

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Results are visualize below. From left to right is original image, sm of DLIS, protected image, sm of DAPter-enabled DLIS.



(a) Arched Eyebrow Inference

(b) Wearing Glasses Inference




(c) Gender Inference





# Security - Auto Recognition Attack

The adversary can use SOTA DL model to label the entropy-reduced outputs of DAPter.




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
**Case 1:** Attack tasks have no correlation with the targeted task.



**Case 2:** Attack tasks have correlations with the targeted task.



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The adversary can use SOTA DL model to reconstruct the original image from the protected one.



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(a) Chubby Inference Task


(b) Wearing Glasses Inference Task

(c) Wearing Lipstick Inference Task



# Take away

**First** investigate the data abuse issue in the scenario of DLIS.






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